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Dying too soon or living too long?
Withdrawing treatment from patients with




Background: In the ruling in Y [2018], the UK Supreme Court has confirmed that there is no general requirement
for the courts in England and Wales to authorise the withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration from
patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness. The perceived requirement, which originated in a court ruling
in 1993, encompassed those in the vegetative state and those in the minimally conscious state. The ruling in Y
confirms that the court may still be approached to decide difficult or contested cases, but there is otherwise no
routine requirement that the judges be approached.
Main body: There is much to welcome in this ruling, particularly as it means that these decisions for these patients
are no longer (unusually) singled out for a judicial decision, with all the financial and emotional costs that court
proceedings can entail. However, there is also a risk that the ruling might have unwelcome consequences. First,
there is the possibility that patients might die too soon, particularly if doctors should now adopt the courts’
previous reasoning, which has suggested that patients in the vegetative state lack interests, so treatment may –
perhaps must – be withdrawn. Secondly, there is the converse possibility that patients might live too long, since
empirical research suggests that – whether intentionally or not – patients’ families, clinicians, and the health system
appear to promote treatment-by-default.
Conclusion: Rather than adopt general positions, which may be contestable and potentially risky, this article
argues, on a pluralistic basis, that the individual patient should be the focus of any decision made in his or her ‘best
interests’. The existing legal framework in England and Wales, which is provided by the Mental Capacity Act 2005,
already points in this direction, although more efforts may be needed to ensure that those involved in making
these decisions are suitably educated and supported. Fortunately, new guidance from the British Medical
Association could help clinicians and families to make decisions in the future, which are appropriate for the
incapacitated individual patient in question.
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Background
English law has long required – or, at least, has appeared
to require – that decisions to withdraw clinically assisted
nutrition and hydration (CANH) from patients with pro-
longed disorders of consciousness (PDOC) be made by a
court. A PDOC ‘refers to a state where a patient has
wakefulness but absent or reduced awareness for more
than 4 weeks’ ([1], p. 1). The term encompasses both
those in the ‘permanent vegetative state’ (PVS), who
have no awareness, and those in the ‘minimally con-
scious state’ (MCS), who have reduced awareness [2].
CANH refers to feeding by tube, rather than orally, and
therefore to the provision of nutrition and hydration via
(for example) nasogastric tube, percutaneous endoscopic
gastrostomy or parenteral nutrition ([3], p. 6).
The (apparent) requirement to come to court arose
from the first ruling in this jurisdiction to consider such
a decision for a patient in the ‘persistent vegetative state’,
as it was then called. In Bland in 1993, the then highest
English court held that such treatment was not in the
best interests of the patient, Anthony Bland, so it could
be withdrawn [4]. Recognising that the court was in un-
familiar, controversial territory, Lord Goff endorsed the
position of the lower courts: as a matter of practice, ‘the
opinion of the court should be sought in all cases similar
to the present’, ‘at least for the time being and until a
body of experience and practice has been built up which
might obviate the need for application in every case’ ([4],
p. 873). Lord Goff hoped, however, that the President of
the High Court ‘will soon feel able to relax the present
requirement so as to limit applications for declarations
to those cases in which there is a special need for the
procedure to be invoked’ ([4], p. 874).
In 2007, the British Medical Association also hoped
the ‘requirement’ would soon be relaxed ([5], p. 61), but
it persisted and, that year, was extended to encompass
the withdrawal of CANH from patients in the MCS [6].
At this time, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 came into
force, with the effect that the new Court of Protection
would now deal with these cases. The Act governs the
(non-)treatment of adults who lack capacity, empower-
ing adults to create an ‘advance decision to refuse treat-
ment’ or confer a ‘lasting power of attorney’ in advance
of losing capacity ([7], sections 9–14, 24–26). The latter,
however, does not confer an unfettered authority on its
donee, since the donee’s decision must align with the
‘best interests’ of the patient ([7], section 9(4)). More-
over, this is generally the test to be applied if the patient
has not created an advance decision to refuse treatment
i.e. decisions must be made in the ‘best interests’ of the
incapacitated individual ([7], section 4). The new Court
would not routinely need to make these decisions;
provided there was no disagreement, decisions would
usually be led by the responsible clinician, albeit in
consultation with those close to the patient. However,
along with the Act came Practice Direction 9E which
held that withholding or withdrawing CANH from pa-
tients in PDOC ‘should be regarded as serious medical
treatment … and should be brought to the court’ ([6],
para. 5).
The situation began to change in 2017. The Court of
Protection Rules Committee withdrew Practice Direc-
tion 9E, with effect from 1 December 2017, and case
law cast further doubt on the ‘requirement’ [8–10].
These cases culminated, in July 2018, with a ruling
from the (now) highest court, the Supreme Court, in Y
[2018], which decisively does away with the require-
ment for a court to make decisions about CANH for
patients in the PVS or MCS, at least where the case is
clear and uncontested [11].
In their analysis of the demise of the Liverpool Care
Pathway [12], Seymour and Clark have called for ‘greater
assessment of the wider risks and more careful consider-
ation of the unintended consequences that might result
from the roll out of new end-of-life interventions’ [13]. Y
might be considered such an intervention and certainly
invites such an assessment. On one view, this is a wel-
come ruling, likely to have positive effects. In this article,
however, I also query whether the decision might also
have unwelcome consequences and I offer some sugges-
tions for avoiding or ameliorating these. I have two –
opposing – consequences in view: the first is that pa-
tients might die too soon, and the second is that patients
might live too long. My argument is inter-disciplinary,
since it is primarily ethical, whilst also drawing on legal
and social scientific sources. In the UK, social scientific
research in this area has been substantially led by the
Coma and Disorders of Consciousness Research Centre
[14], whose members – in particular Jenny and Celia
Kitzinger – have undertaken a range of theoretical and
empirical research, on which I will draw. Theirs are
qualitative (not quantitative) data, from which, some
argue, it is inappropriate to generalise [15]. However, the
broader commonality of their findings and themes indi-
cate that there may be a case for their generalisability
(or, at least, transferability) [16], particularly when com-
bined with ethical arguments as I seek to do here.1
Main body
The decision in Y [2018]
Briefly summarised, the Supreme Court decision concerned
Mr. Y, who had suffered a cardiac arrest in June 2017,
which resulted in severe cerebral hypoxia and extensive
1The arguments herein essentially pick up the Kitzingers’ gauntlet, by
(in part) using their empirical findings to inform the following ethical
analysis. Questions might arise about the legitimacy of these
methodological manoeuvres, although they may be defended by
reference to developments in ‘empirical bioethics’ research (e.g. [17]).
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brain damage. He did not recover consciousness after the
arrest. In September, his treating clinician concluded he
had a PDOC; in October, an expert second opinion consid-
ered him to be in a vegetative state (VS). The clinical team
and Y’s family agreed that CANH should be withdrawn.
Court proceedings began in November, specifically to con-
firm that court approval was not mandatory and that no
civil or criminal liability would result if CANH were with-
drawn. The Queen’s Bench Division agreed, but a direct ap-
peal to the Supreme Court was permitted [18]. Mr. Y died
in December, with CANH in place, after having developed
acute respiratory sepsis, but the appeal proceeded given the
importance of the issues.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Delivering the
court’s judgment, Lady Black held that neither domestic law
nor the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
gave rise to a mandatory requirement to involve the court in
making decisions about withdrawing CANH from every pa-
tient with a PDOC. The fundamental question for a doctor
or a court was whether it was lawful to provide treatment.
Leaving aside any advance decision to refuse treatment or
lasting power of attorney ([7], sections 9–14, 24–26), lawful-
ness turned on the best interests of the patient. The com-
mon law did not impose a legal requirement to come to
court for these best interests decisions for these patients.
Bland made only a good practice recommendation [4]. The
2005 Act also did not impose any such requirement (indeed,
although the Act adopted many of the Law Commission’s
preceding recommendations, it did not enact this particular
recommendation). The accompanying Code of Practice was
found to be less helpful, as it used contradictory language,
sometimes suggesting such cases ‘must’ come to court, else-
where indicating they ‘should’ as ‘a matter of practice’ ([19],
para. 6.18, 8.18, 8.19). However, according to Lady Black,
rulings succeeding the 2005 Act also did not convey any re-
quirement ([11], para. 98).
The ECHR equally did not give rise to the need for
such a requirement. UK law appeared fully compliant
with the ECHR, since it has a compatible regulatory
framework enshrined in the Act, Code and professional
guidance (e.g. [20]), which requires clinicians to take
into account the views of the patient, those close to him,
and other professionals, and the court is always available
whether or not there is a dispute. Lady Black noted that
neither CANH nor these patients should be singled out
for court oversight; CANH is medical treatment, so the
general regulatory framework can apply.
Lady Black closed, however, with the suggestion that, if
the way forward is finely balanced, or there is a
difference of medical opinion, or a lack of agreement
to a proposed course of action from those with an
interest in the patient’s welfare, a court application
can and should be made ([11], para. 125).
As such, difficult cases can and should still come to
court, but there is otherwise no requirement for a court
to authorise the withdrawal of CANH from a patient
with a PDOC.
Welcome consequences?
With respect, the Supreme Court may have overstated its
view that there was no requirement to bring these cases to
court; everyone else – including some other judges – as-
sumed there was [21, 22]. Certainly, the language oscillated
between ‘should’ and ‘must’, but the latter undeniably
featured, for example, in Lord Goff’s reference in Bland to
there being a ‘requirement’ for such cases to come to court
([4], p. 874). Ironically, Lady Black’s judgment even
threatens to re-open the can of worms that her ruling
sought to close. There is some equivocation in her language
regarding future cases that might merit a court ruling: she
says there will be situations in which an application ‘can
and should be made’, or ‘will be required (or desirable)’,
and also that unresolved disputes ‘must inevitably be put
before the court’ ([11], para. 109, 125, 126). This equivoca-
tion is unhelpful. Future situations are conceivable, in
which clinicians and those close to the patient disagree
about treatment withdrawal, but this wording threatens to
leave neither group certain about the way forward. On one
reading, a disagreement ‘must’ come to court; on another, a
judicial decision may be ‘desirable’ but is not obligatory.
Presumably, Lady Black’s comments should be read charit-
ably in light of the overall judgment, which (inter alia) holds
that the courts cannot and did not create an obligation as
such. As such, Lady Black seems to be offering good prac-
tice recommendations: difficult cases should – but not
must – come to court.
Despite this unwelcome new uncertainty, there are vari-
ous reasons to welcome this ruling, many of which were
noted by Lady Black. First, the decision brings English law
in line with law elsewhere [23, 24]. Second, the decision re-
stores some coherence to English law [24, 25]. The court’s
appreciation of the legal and ethical questions arising in
and from Bland was laudable, but the legality of removing
CANH was settled long ago (see also [26]), and it seemed
unusual to single out this treatment (CANH) and these pa-
tients (with PDOC) for judicial oversight, particularly in sit-
uations where every interested party was in agreement.
Third, families will no longer routinely be required to go to
court, with all the distress this can entail [24]. Fourth, the fi-
nancial costs incurred by the health service, and even some
families,2 will be saved; the legal process has been estimated
2The courts have noted ‘alarming’ situations in which legal aid was
unavailable to the families bringing or participating in proceedings
([27], para. 12). New guidance from the British Medical Association,
discussed below, proposes that court ‘proceedings should be initiated
and funded by the relevant NHS body responsible for commissioning
or providing the patient’s treatment’ ([3], p. 40).
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to cost £122,000 per patient [28]. Finally, the ruling has the
potential to reduce the delay – an additional 9months on
average – in getting the outcome that some families and
clinicians want i.e. the withdrawal of CANH [28].
The ruling is therefore likely to have positive effects.
But negative consequences are also conceivable, of
which I will explore two. The first is the possibility that,
following this decision, patients with PDOC might die
too soon, but, secondly and conversely, there is also the
possibility that such patients might live too long.
Dying too soon?
The Kitzingers’ research indicates that families’ views
change with experience and as prognoses become clearer
[29]. Early months and years might be spent seeking
treatment and hoping for recovery, but many later come
to view their loved one as having suffered ‘a fate worse
than death’ during this time [29]. Yet, this does not ne-
cessarily mean that every family welcomes the prospect
of a death for their loved ones that is initiated via the re-
moval of tube-feeding. For some, this was because the
method (i.e. withdrawal of CANH), rather than the out-
come (i.e. death), was considered ‘too cruel’ ([29], p.
159); the Kitzingers have, indeed, argued that there may
be a role for active euthanasia here [30]. For other fam-
ilies, however, it was the outcome, regardless of the
means by which it eventuated, which was problematic.
One such wife describes her ‘battle’ to defend her hus-
band’s life ([29], p. 158). Contrary to what such a spouse
might wish, however, and despite the suggestion in the
new ruling that cases of dispute should (or must?) still
come to court, there are at least three reasons why the
ruling in Y might increase the chances of life-sustaining
treatment being withdrawn.
First, some consider the previous requirement for a judi-
cial decision in all such cases to have been a deterrent to
seeking the removal of CANH. Some of the Kitzingers’
participants were reportedly reassured by the existence of
the perceived legal obstacle, one taking comfort from be-
ing informed by a lawyer about ‘how hard it is to turn off
someone’s feed. […] you have to go to the High Court and
it’s a very big thing to have done’ [31]. The ruling in Y, of
course, removes this particular obstacle, and thus one
clear deterrent to the removal of CANH. Where, however,
the doctors wish to discontinue treatment, but the family
wants it to continue, the family can continue to take com-
fort from these perceived legal hurdles, which might still
serve to deter the clinicians from approaching the court.
Pro-treatment families might nevertheless be dis-
quieted, secondly, by the possibility that cost consider-
ations might exert some influence in the clinic. The
courts have insisted that their focus is on the best inter-
ests of the individual patient, rather than any ‘external’
considerations, such as the costs of treatment ([32], para.
205, 206). These can be considerable, with the cost of
sustaining a PVS patient estimated at £90,000 per year
[33]. The courts may be wary of factoring this (overtly)
into their decisions but, especially in an era of austerity
and stretched healthcare resources, these considerations
at least have the potential to influence decisions about
(non-)treatment.
There is, however, a third reason why patients might
die too soon, which could prove to be the most influen-
tial, since it focuses on the legal logic emerging from
some of the cases to date, which will presumably (con-
tinue to?) guide clinical practice in this area. This legal
logic strongly implies that CANH should – maybe even
must – stop, at least if or when the patient is confirmed
to be in a PVS. Estimates suggest that, since Bland, the
courts have adjudicated on the fates of more than 100
patients in the PVS ([33], p. 12). It appears that every
case has resulted in the withholding or withdrawing of
CANH. The one apparent outlier case involved the court
authorising a short trial of a sleeping pill, in an experi-
mental final attempt to see if this could restore the pa-
tient’s consciousness [34]. It did not, and the matter
returned to court, where the withdrawal of CANH –
which the family had initially sought – was authorised
[35]. The same result has uniformly obtained in other
PVS cases, including those in which family members were
opposed to withdrawal (e.g. [36]). Rightly or wrongly, the
courts’ role in PVS cases essentially became one of con-
firming the diagnosis {24];3 once this matter was settled,
the withdrawal of CANH would be authorised by the
courts, seemingly regardless of the family’s views.
The test for making such a decision appeared – and
appears – to be the best interests of the patient, a multi-
factorial test that is now enshrined in the Mental Cap-
acity Act 2005 ([7], section 4). That certainly continues
to be the test applied to other incapacitated patients, in-
cluding those in the MCS [38]. A best interests decision
requires the courts (and, by extension, other decision-
makers) to weigh up the different factors for and against
treatment before reaching their decisions. However, the
judicial approach to patients in the PVS has differed
considerably. The courts have generally confirmed that
the proper question is whether treatment, as opposed to
non-treatment, is in the best interests of the incapaci-
tated patient ([39], para. 20). However, the courts have
consistently answered that question in the negative if the
patient is in a PVS and they have held that, in these
cases, there is no question of balancing different consid-
erations, such as what the patient and/or his or her fam-
ily might want. As such, the courts do not undertake a
balancing exercise in these cases: once the PVS diagnosis
is confirmed, treatment will be withdrawn.
3Although, commenting on Y ([11], para. 119), see also [37].
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These negative answers arise from the legal logic de-
ployed by the judges. The rulings have suggested that
continued treatment of those in the PVS is ‘futile’ ([4], p.
869 [40];, para. 66). The position originated in Bland, in
which Lord Mustill also stated that the patient had ‘no
best interests of any kind’ ([4], p. 897). Although the
2005 Act supersedes Bland, and the courts’ understand-
ing of ‘futility’ is evolving [41], both elements of this
logic have endured, with Newton J in Re P [2015] stating
succinctly:
If P is in VS, and there is no real prospect of recovery,
then it would not be in his best interests to continue
treat him (because a person in a continuing vegetative
state has no interests and therefore no best interests)
([42], para. 13).
This logic has been challenged. Keown, a defender of
the sanctity (or intrinsic value) of life, has argued that
CANH is not futile, because it is evidently feeding the
patient, and countered that it would certainly be con-
trary to a PVS patient’s interests to use him or her as a
sideboard ([43], p. 494). Baines is more sympathetic to
Lord Mustill’s position, although he concedes that using
patients like furniture might still be wrong, albeit on
some other basis, such as an affront to the patient’s dig-
nity [44]. But, whatever its philosophical merits, the legal
logic remains: the PVS patient has no best interests and
treatment is futile. Clinicians presumably must operate
in the shadow of the courts. If so, the message to them
appears to be clear: once the PVS diagnosis is settled,
CANH can and should be stopped.
This legal message might amount to more than a rec-
ommendation: it might be considered a mandatory re-
quirement. Some of the Law Lords in Bland held that
there was no duty to treat a PVS patient if treatment
was not in his or her best interests ([4], pp. 858, 877).
Yet, some went further, holding that there was no en-
titlement to treat in such a situation – indeed, doing so
could amount to trespass or assault ([4], pp. 883, 885,
876, 877). The Supreme Court has since repeated the
latter proposition:
If the treatment is not in his best interests, the court
will not be able to give its consent on his behalf and it
will follow that it will be lawful to withhold or
withdraw it. Indeed, it will follow that it will not be
lawful to give it ([39], para. 22).
If that logic must move from the courtroom to the
clinic, then clinicians apparently must cease treatment
once an irrecoverable PVS diagnosis has been confirmed.
It warrants emphasis that this is the legal logic, which
(as we will explore in the next section) might not be
shared by clinicians. But if, regardless of any misgivings
they might have, clinicians must now absorb and apply
the legal logic, then treatment must apparently be with-
drawn from those in the PVS. There is also reason to
suspect that, in practice, this requirement could apply
not only to patients in the PVS, but also to those in the
MCS. Diagnosis of PDOCs requires specialist expertise
and is notoriously difficult, with the Kitzingers describ-
ing a ‘diagnostic illusory’ [45], and some experts arguing
that ‘It is not possible to identify the vegetative state as
an obviously different state from the (lower end of) min-
imally conscious state’ ([46], p. 443). If that is the case,
then it is conceivable that not only patients in the PVS,
but also those in the MCS will face the prospect of dying
too soon.
In sum, the removal of a perceived deterrent, the
vexed question of costs, and (especially) the legal logic
in favour of withdrawal might therefore increase the
likelihood of treatment routinely being withdrawn from
patients in PDOC. The prospect of these (or perhaps
any) patients dying too soon for lack of sufficient safe-
guards is likely to concern many, and not only those
family members or others who believe in the sanctity of
human life. Series, for example, worries that the ruling
in Y ‘has more deeply entrenched a very wide ranging de
facto power to make decisions with serious human rights
implications, and very limited safeguards’ [47]. If treat-
ment withdrawal does increase or become the default
position, then this might have further unintended conse-
quences. For example, routine withdrawal of treatment
from these patients could inhibit future research that
might benefit current and future patients. As the courts
have previously acknowledged, there may be situations
in which therapeutic research (or an experimental pro-
cedure) has the potential to benefit the individual patient
[34]. Research might also come to benefit the whole co-
hort of patients. Yet, if the numbers of such patients
who are sustained declines substantially (potentially even
to zero), then there may be too few (or no) such patients
to enable – or event warrant – research in this area.
However, we need not labour these potential conse-
quences, because there is reason to suspect that the
more likely consequence will drive in the opposite direc-
tion: rather than patients dying too soon, they might be
more likely to live too long.
Living too long?
A range of factors, which cluster around the patients’
families, the clinicians, and the health system, suggests
that a more likely consequence of this ruling is that
treatment will continue for patients in PDOC – whether
or not this is best for the particular patient.
First, patients’ families may be one of the (unwilling or
unwitting) barriers to non-treatment. The Kitzingers’
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research indicates at least three reasons why this might
prove to be the case. First, families might lack the pertinent
clinical and legal knowledge. Families tend to depend on
clinicians for information about their loved one’s condition,
prognosis and the (treatment and non-treatment) options
that are available. The Kitzingers’ research suggests, how-
ever, that there are persistent failures in communication.
One family reported such a lack of communication from
the clinicians, which left them ‘second guessing at the fu-
ture, at the state of Mum, where she was going’ ([31], p.
13). This family, like others, reported ‘not even knowing’,
‘years down the line’ that withdrawal of treatment was an
option ([31], p. 13).
This is significant because, second, the Kitzingers have
found that families, rather than clinicians, tend to be the
ones who propose or lobby for the withdrawal of CANH.
For example, one of the Kitzingers’ articles focuses on
the experiences of five families and, ‘[i]n all five cases, it
was family members (not healthcare teams) who initi-
ated discussion about withdrawal of ANH’ ([31], p. 13).
These families were also ‘active agents in the court appli-
cation process’, who ‘saw themselves as behaving cour-
ageously on behalf of their relative in actively supporting
the decision to withdraw ANH’ ([31], p. 12). The family
therefore needs the requisite knowledge and a measure
of courage to push for withdrawal; where these are lack-
ing, treatment seems likely to continue.
Third, some of those families who have gone to court
took comfort from the sense that the court was sharing
with them the burden of deciding. Halliday et al. describe
the judgments as containing ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’,
since they ‘operate as memorials of the living dead’ and
formally affirm the suffering the family has endured ([24],
p. 569). The court, of course, is ultimately the one to de-
cide and research participants have spoken of the court
having ‘shielded’ them from assuming sole responsibility
for the decision to end treatment ([31], p. 13). In the ab-
sence of the court’s shield, however, it is conceivable that
families may consider such a (perceived) responsibility to
be too great a burden, so treatment will continue.
These findings combine to suggest that families might
lack the knowledge, energy or desire to seek treatment
withdrawal, so treatment will continue by default. The
clinicians also play an important role in compelling this
result. Research points to at least five reasons why treat-
ment might continue.
First, there have long been concerns about over-
treatment in healthcare generally. According to a recent
medical editorial:
Ineffective and harmful medical practices have always
been with us, but the scale and institutionalisation of
overdiagnosis and overtreatment have expanded
exponentially in the last few decades ([48], p. 116).
There may be many reasons for over-treatment but
one to which the Kitzingers refer in this specific context,
is that of the conscientious beliefs of the treating clini-
cians. Some families to whom they spoke believed that
proceedings were deliberately obstructed or prolonged,
because the clinicians had ethical or religious objections
to treatment-withdrawal [33, 49]. These sorts of objec-
tions will undoubtedly persist and they might similarly
prevent families from seeking or securing the withdrawal
of treatment without going to court.
Moreover, third, empirical research reveals that clini-
cians lack adequate knowledge about the complexities of
PDOC. As we have seen, diagnosis is complicated, re-
quiring specialist input, using specialist tools. Official
figures are lacking, but estimates suggest that, in the UK,
there are 4000–16,000 patients in PVS, with three times
as many in the MCS [1]. These are substantial numbers,
but many healthcare professionals still lack experience in
dealing with such patients ([31], p. 13). This means that
the professionals can be ignorant of good practice in this
area. For example, the Kitzingers report on a case, in
which the team informed the family that a PVS diagnosis
could only be confirmed 1 year after the precipitating
event ([33], p. 3). This is accurate, but only in cases
where that event was a ‘traumatic’ injury ([2], p. 10); in
the case in question, the cause was a non-traumatic in-
jury, so the diagnosis could have been confirmed after
only 6 months.4
Fourth, as the latter case demonstrated, there can be
delays in gathering the requisite information, which can
even mean that the opportunity to allow the patient to
die is lost. In the aforementioned case, some of the ne-
cessary diagnostic tests only occurred 2 years after the
patient’s injury, ‘in spite of there being no clinical reason
for the delay and in spite of the family pressing for such
assessments to take place as soon as possible’ ([33], p. 3).
Other cases have involved even longer delays, with one
PVS patient being sustained for 23 years [50]. Delays are
problematic, say the Kitzingers, in part because the ‘win-
dow of opportunity’ for allowing death, through the
withholding or withdrawing of treatment, can close [49].
This tragically appears to have been the case for their
sister, Polly, who, after 2 years in a PDOC following a
car accident, regained consciousness ‘but her brain injur-
ies have left her permanently dependent on 24/7 care for
all her needs’ [51]. Although her sisters are convinced
4In this regard, note that Mr. Y had suffered cardiac arrest and lost
consciousness in June 2017. He was diagnosed in a vegetative state in
October and his case came to court on 1 November 2017 ([11], para.
3, 4). The Royal College of Physicians guidance (ibid) states that ‘VS
may be classified as “permanent VS” if it has persisted for … >6
months following anoxic or other metabolic brain injury’ ([2], p. 10).
As such, at the time of the initial hearing, Mr. Y was not (yet) in a
permanent vegetative state.
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that Polly would not value life in this condition, the doc-
tors had declined to withdraw feeding and, now, the op-
portunity to do so has gone, since Polly receives nutrition
orally.5
An inclination to over-treat, delays and ignorance of
PDOC are not the only drivers of (continued) treatment,
however. Fifth, there is evidence that clinicians are also
ignorant of the law in this area, with its central focus on
the best interests of the patient. In 2014, the House of
Lords’ Post-Legislative Scrutiny of the Mental Capacity
Act found that the legislation ‘needs a higher profile
among professionals in order to be properly understood
and effectively implemented’ ([52], para. 135). Little
wonder that families are legally ill informed if clinicians
are too. The Kitzingers accordingly express concern
about ‘the (sometimes total) absence of best interest
consultations, default presumptions of continued treat-
ment and decision making based on criteria other than
the best interests of the patient’ ([31], p. 16).
Families and clinicians may therefore act, whether
intentionally or not, as barriers to treatment withdrawal.
But so too does the health system in which they all find
themselves, due to a confluence of factors [50]. The sys-
tem is fragmented, disjointed and ineffective, and it lacks
the resilience to respond to emerging dilemmas. Health
professionals administer the system, but they do not
fully understand it and lack the support to navigate it.
There is a lack of access to medical and legal expertise.
And, as we have already seen, there are failures in commu-
nication, not only between families and clinicians, but also
between different professionals [51]. These factors lead
the Kitzingers to conclude that ‘the institutionalized
provision of long-term treatment-by-default normalizes
sustaining life in PVS making it difficult for families (or
staff) to consider alternatives’ ([51], p. 13).
Going forward?
The ruling in Y has therefore removed one barrier to the
withdrawal of CANH from patients in PDOC, which is
likely to have some positive effects. It might, however,
either tend to patients dying too soon or else lead to
them living too long. Either looks like a plausible possi-
bility. The possibility that patients might die too soon
appears the less likely – but is still conceivable. The legal
logic, which holds that PVS patients (at least) should not
be treated because they lack interests and treatment is
futile, appears to be the strongest driver in this direction.
Admittedly, that logic appears not – or not yet – to have
moved from the courtroom to the clinic. However, that
might be because the logic could not hitherto have
moved between settings, since a court decision was re-
quired (or, at least, recommended). Now, of course,
there is no such uniform barrier, so the logic might well
transfer to the clinic, resulting in many more than the
100 or so patients to date having CANH withdrawn.
Judging by the Kitzingers’ research, however, the second
possibility of patients living too long appears to be the
more likely outcome, since – whether intentionally or
not – patients’ families, clinicians, and the health system
combine to promote treatment-by-default.
Which, if either, of these is a desirable or appropriate out-
come is debatable. The ethical defensibility of discontinuing
treatment from these, and other, patients obviously remains
contested. There is, however, a case for favouring a pluralis-
tic, case-by-case approach, in which decisions are based on
the particularities of the patient. Such a case finds support
both in practice and in principle.
In practice, the law (and professional guidance) gener-
ally adopts a principle – the best interests principle –
which accommodates a wide variety of factors and sup-
ports a wide variety of decisions. Although there are
pockets of uniformity, and therefore groups of cases in
which a ‘rule’ appears to operate, a decision for or
against treatment in a particular case is not generally a
foregone conclusion [53]. This pluralism can be a source
of strength and of weakness ([54], p. 173). On one view,
the concept of law requires there to be rules, which can
guide human behaviour ([55], p. 96). However, the law
on best interests generally appears to vest a great deal of
discretion in decision-makers, such as judges [56]. Plur-
ality and discretion can create uncertainty and unpre-
dictability, and accordingly inhibit the law from meeting
its action-guiding goal [38, 53].
Yet, the flexibility of the legal standard can also be
judged more positively. Rather than ‘elaborate’ a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach, which might be tethered to a par-
ticular value, the current approach merely ‘enumerates’
some of the various different factors and values that can
have a bearing on the case at hand [57]. Such a position
is defensible in principle: value pluralism is tolerant of
moral diversity, since it recognises that there can be a
plurality of moral values, which are not necessarily
amenable to ranking or resolution [58]. Value pluralism
also recognises that investing wholly in one value and
therefore in one decision can be risky, since it may prove
to be the wrong value and wrong decision. Applied to
our cases, it may be right for some patients with PDOC
to live and others to die. What value pluralism encour-
ages, however, is recognition that the ‘right’ decision can
vary between patients.
This defence is admittedly brief, but it at least begins
to provide a basis for holding to a pluralistic standard.
There are, of course, alternatives to the best interests
standard, such as a substituted judgment standard, a
5Her sister reports, however, that ‘we have a “do not attempt
resuscitation” notice informed by her values and beliefs and she
wouldn’t be treated for life-threatening infections’ [51].
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harm standard or an approach which is more oriented
towards what incapacitated persons do or would want
[59–61]. The Law Commission has favoured the latter
approach, proposing that decision-makers should ‘be re-
quired to consider the person’s ascertained wishes and
feelings when a best interests determination is being
made’ ([62], para. 1.36), although this proposal did not
feature in the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019,
which reformed the law governing deprivation of liberty
[63]. Whether or not proposals like these will gain
ground, the latter autonomy-led arguments do at least
provide further support for the proposition that deci-
sions should be made on a case-by-case basis, which in-
volves looking to the particularities of this patient.
Bringing these arguments together, the first recom-
mendation is that law (and, correspondingly, profes-
sional guidance and practice) should continue to adopt a
pluralistic standard, according to which decisions should
be made on the basis of the plural factors relevant to the
case in question. Although more research is needed
here, [64] the best interests standard might offer a suit-
able basis for making decisions in this area (and, indeed,
others). If this standard, or some version thereof, is
retained, then more certain and predictable rules might
yet emerge from its application, but – importantly –
there should still be careful attention to what is appro-
priate for this patient in these particular circumstances.
Hopefully, through such an approach, law can serve to
guide people, whilst also respecting diversity.
Whether or not the best interests standard is for the
best, this is undoubtedly the standard that the law cur-
rently adopts. Both the Kitzingers and the House of
Lords’ 2014 review of the Act implicitly recognise that
the existing law already has the capacity to address many
of the perceived problems we have surveyed. It follows
that the problems of dying too soon or living too long
can be avoided or ameliorated, if effort is expended in
ensuring that people are aware of the law and they prac-
tice accordingly.
First, then, the relevant people should be made aware
of the law in this area. This will require effort on the
part of healthcare professionals, the health service, and
perhaps also patients and families themselves. The
health service should at least ensure that professionals
are suitably informed and educated about the Mental
Capacity Act, its Code and applicable professional guid-
ance, so that professionals can, in turn, inform and
support patients and their loved ones. The law has long
been in place but, as the 2014 review and the Kitzingers’
research found, professionals appear not to be ad-
equately informed. Important headlines contained within
the legal framework that must be grasped include the
focus on the best interests of the patient, which requires
reference to his or her known or anticipated wishes and
consultation with his or her loved ones, plus those provi-
sions pertaining to surrogate decision-makers and ad-
vance decisions to refuse treatment.
Second, and focusing specifically on best interests deci-
sions, robust processes are needed, to ensure that deci-
sions are timely, regularly reviewed, take due account of
the relevant factors and perspectives, and are appropri-
ately documented. Best interests decisions should certainly
be more timely than in some of the cases we have consid-
ered, especially if it will be best for some patients to slip
through the ‘window of opportunity’ i.e. have treatment
withdrawn. Review – including, where necessary, recourse
to second opinions – is also important, to ensure the deci-
sions are indeed for the best at the relevant time. Asses-
sing what is best will require attention to all aspects of the
patient’s treatment and reference to a plurality of factors
and perspectives, including not only family views, but also
‘high-quality’ diagnostic and prognostic information ([50],
p. 138). Here, as elsewhere in healthcare, good communi-
cation will be essential, both between professionals and
between professionals and families.
In this regard, it is also important to clarify where re-
sponsibility for the decision lies and why the family’s
views are being sought. Put simply, the decision lies with
the responsible clinician – although, admittedly, who this
is will sometimes need to be clarified ([50], p. 140). As
such, the family does not make the ultimate decision; ra-
ther, its views will be sought in order to ascertain what
the patient would have wanted. Families therefore do
not carry the responsibility for decisions, although they
should be involved in making them. It also follows that,
unlike some of those cases considered here, families
should not be required to raise the prospect of with-
drawal. Finally in this regard, the Kitzingers recommend
that organisations responsible for inspecting care (such
as the Care Quality Commission) and for funding care
(such as Clinical Commissioning Groups) should ensure
that appropriate decisions are being made, by seeking
suitable documentation and holding decision-makers to
account ([50], p. 139). The documentation should in-
clude records of best interests decisions, and it may also
be useful to create a register of all those entering (or in)
a PDOC ([50], p. 140 [65];, p. 340).
Hopefully, by acting on these sorts of recommendations,
we can prevent families – and some professionals – from
feeling ‘trapped in a system of “care delivery” which seems
to have its own logic and momentum’ ([50], p. 137). The
Kitzingers were here referring to the prospect of
treatment-by-default, but it is also important to avoid
withdrawal-by-default. Rather than generalised proposi-
tions, which point automatically to one or other conse-
quence, regardless of who the patient is, individualised
decisions are needed, which seek to secure the right result
for the particular patient.
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Fortunately, new professional guidance captures many
of these suggestions. In December 2018, the British
Medical Association and Royal College of Physicians
published guidance, endorsed by the General Medical
Council, on CANH for patients who lack the capacity to
consent [3]. Just as the law, following Y, no longer sin-
gles out those with PDOC, the guidance covers not only
these patients, but also those with progressive neurode-
generative conditions, multiple comorbidities or frailty,
or other brain injuries. Amongst the topics covered in
the guidance are: the legal position; who makes decisions
and who must be consulted; conscientious objections;
clinical assessments and second opinions; best interests
assessments; managing disagreement and uncertainty;
keeping records; and governance and audit.
The guidance addresses many of the points made
here.6 The opening summary acknowledges that errors
might be made in either direction, since a ‘wrong deci-
sion … could result either in CANH being withdrawn
too soon – thus depriving the patient of an opportunity
to live a life they would value – or of it being continued
too long – forcing the individual to continue a life they
would not have wanted’ ([3], p. 8). The guidance also re-
peatedly makes explicit the importance of an individua-
lised, case-by-case approach, which is focused on the
patient:
The central point to keep in mind, throughout the
decision-making process, is that the decision is about
what is in the best interests of the individual patient,
not what is best for those who are close to them, what
most people in their situation would want, or what is
best for the family, the care team or the providers or
funders of care ([3], p. 30).
The Kitzingers participated in the drafting, so it is not
surprising that (on three occasions) the guidance coun-
sels against the continuation of treatment ‘by default’
([3], pp. 23, 26, 71). In line with recent court rulings,
and indeed arguments advanced elsewhere, the guidance
is also notably orientated towards an autonomy-driven
reading of ‘best interests’ [39, 61]. In the opening sum-
mary, for example, the point is made that the presump-
tion in favour of providing life-sustaining treatment ‘can
be rebutted if there is clear evidence that a patient would
not want CANH provided in the circumstances that
have arisen’. ([3], p. 6) The guidance also emphasises the
need for robust best interests processes, along with suit-
able record-keeping and monitoring (e.g. [3], pp. 56–68).
Finally, the guidance explicitly notes the need for train-
ing and support in the implementation of the guidance
(and, by extension, the law) ([3], pp. 71–74), with the
website including training materials (https://www.bma.
org.uk/advice/employment/ethics/mental-capacity/clinic
ally-assisted-nutrition-and-hydration).
There is, then, much to welcome in this guidance. How-
ever, its length might inhibit its uptake, since the main
guidance for doctors runs to 100 pages. This does at least
ensure that the requisite detail and the associated complex-
ities are conveyed. Moreover, the main guidance is supple-
mented by, for example, a summary and infographics,
which should help to ensure that the key messages are ac-
cessible (https://www.bma.org.uk/advice/employment/eth
ics/mental-capacity/clinically-assisted-nutrition-and-hydra
tion). The messages are also, commendably, not only di-
rected towards doctors, as there is also information tar-
geted to families and to other healthcare professionals,
funders and managers. Of course, as experience with the
Liverpool Care Pathway suggested, efforts will now be
needed to ensure that the relevant messages are heard and
heeded in practice [13]. In short, attention must now turn
to translating the guidance into practice, by ensuring that
those involved in these decisions – and particularly the
responsible doctors – are suitably trained and supported
going forward.
Conclusion
Questions continue to surround the treatment and non-
treatment of patients with prolonged disorders of con-
sciousness, including some about the language that
should be used to describe and categorise these patients
[66, 67]. The Supreme Court has decisively answered
one such question, finding that there is no general re-
quirement for decisions about the (non-)provision of
clinically assisted nutrition and hydration to be made by
a court. This appears to be a welcome decision, since it
enhances the coherence of the law and avoids or reduces
the emotional and financial costs associated with re-
course to the courts.
The ruling might nevertheless have (unintended) nega-
tive consequences. Patients might be at risk of dying too
soon, particularly as the courts’ logic to date seems in-
clined towards withdrawal-by-default if the patient is in
a PVS. Alternatively, patients with PDOC might be at
risk of living too long, since there are various individual
and systemic factors which seem to promote treatment-
by-default. Blanket policies could be avoided if clinicians
(and others) are better informed about the law and they
practice accordingly. Hopefully, recent professional guid-
ance and its accompanying training materials will help
to clarify matters for those involved – provided, of
course, that sufficient effort is put into delivering train-
ing and support, so that the relevant messages can be
heard and heeded. Ethically, as the guidance also empha-
sises, it appears that a patient-specific approach is more
6Please note that the author provided comments on drafts of the
guidance.
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defensible than generalised, objective judgments. Quite
what the basis for these decisions should be, however,
remains open to question. The best interests standard
can accommodate and encourage a patient-specific ap-
proach, but its ethical defensibility has been challenged
and alternatives have been proffered. For its part, the
guidance follows the courts in emphasising the need to
look to what this patient would (or would not) want in
ascertaining his or her best interests. Future research
will hopefully shed more light on how that standard
might best be interpreted for these – and other – pa-
tients and whether it should be modified or even re-
placed entirely.
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